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DEPT FOR ISN/MNSA, IO/GS, EAP/CM

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2019  
TAGS: [AORC](#) [PREL](#) [KNNP](#) [IAEA](#) [MG](#)  
SUBJECT: GUIDANCE REQUEST ON MONGOLIAN NWFZ

REF: MENOLD-PAPPAS EMAILS 12/09-11

Classified By: Ambassador Glyn T. Davies for reasons 1.4 b and d

11. (C) Following the November Board session in which Mongolia supported both the Board resolution censuring Iran and the Russian LEU bank resolution, Mongolian Ambassador Enkhsaikhan approached Ambassador Davies December 11 on the longstanding issue of the establishment of a Mongolian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ). Enkhsaikhan did not imply this as "payback" for supporting U.S. positions in the Board; rather, he highlighted that Mongolia seeks a closer relationship with the U.S. as a counterweight to Russia and China. Savvy and well-informed, Enkhsaikhan also shares U.S. concerns on Iran and DPRK's nuclear programs and is not reticent about breaking ranks with the NAM in the IAEA Board of Governors. Still, Mongolia's quest for recognition as a NWFZ has been a personal crusade for Enkhsaikhan, who remains the GOM's coordinator and focal point on the issue (hence the demarche in Vienna). He clearly hoped, citing the impact of the President's Prague speech, that the Obama Administration might re-evaluate the U.S. position on the Mongolian NWFZ as it had the CTBT. Ambassador Davies could give no indication of any such shift in our policy, but promised to "educate himself" on the issue.

12. (C) Having championed this cause since 1992, Enkhsaikhan is well aware of U.S. opposition to a single-country NWFZ in Mongolia. When the Ambassador laid out the U.S. concern that a Mongolian single-country zone would set an unacceptable precedent, he took issue, asserting that Mongolia's unique geographical position between two nuclear powers and inability to join any regional NWFZ makes it a unique case. Enkhsaikhan explained that Mongolia continues to seek legally binding commitments (particularly from Russia and China), as it views existing political security assurances by UN bodies, cited by Ambassador Davies as impressive achievements, as insufficient. Since 2006, Mongolia has pursued a trilateral agreement on a NWFZ with Russia and China with an additional protocol intended for the P3.

13. (C) Updating on recent negotiations, Enkhsaikhan reported that meeting twice in Geneva in 2009, Russia and China signaled no major issues with the agreement but requested that the P3 also be "on board." He acknowledged it was more likely the P3 might subscribe to an additional protocol rather than a five-party agreement, which would be "too much" to ask. Enkhsaikhan provided a copy of the draft agreement and protocol for our comment (full texts emailed to ISN/MNSA). The key provisions of the protocol commit parties to contribute to full implementation of the NWFZ and to seek

immediate UN Security Council joint action should Mongolia become the object of threat of the use of force, "including nuclear weapons." Mongolia had not demarched the UK or France, trusting that the U.S. would consult with the other P3. Ambassador Davies agreed to seek guidance on the texts.

¶4. (SBU) Enkhsaikhan also noted the recent consensus adoption of the UNGA resolution on "the Second Conference on NWFZs and Mongolia," the title of which, he argued, reinforced Mongolia's uniqueness, recognized by the UNGA and UN Security Council since 2001. Mongolia hoped that this conference, slated to take place just before the NPT Revcon, would be an opportunity to take a second look at a Mongolian NWFZ, an issue which Enkhsaikhan observed has been on the agenda for 17 years.

¶5. (C) Guidance Request: Mission seeks guidance in response to Enkhsaikhan's demarche on the U.S. position regarding the draft trilateral treaty with Russia and China and accompanying additional protocol for the P3. Although we recognize there may be legal impediments, a forward leaning posture on this issue would help secure Mongolia's support both on the Board of Governors, where Mongolia holds a rotating seat until fall 2011, as well as in the context of the NPT Revcon.

DAVIES